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Why Broadband Pricing Freedom Is Good For Consumers 
 
by 
 
Daniel A. Lyons   
 
Usage-based pricing has rapidly become one of the most high-profile topics in Internet 
policy. In the past few years, many broadband providers have migrated from all-you-
can-eat flat-rate pricing to consumption-based pricing models such as tiered service 
plans or data caps. This trend has been most prominent in the wireless sector, where 
monthly limits were an almost inevitable solution to the surge in bandwidth demand 
unleashed by the smartphone revolution. Some fixed broadband providers have 
adopted much larger data caps for residential broadband use as well. 
 
While regulators have generally approved this shift,1 some consumer groups have 
viewed the change with skepticism. They fear that usage-based pricing will usher in an 
era of higher prices, deteriorating service, and increasingly anticompetitive conduct.2 
They are concerned that pricing tiers or data caps serve as anticompetitive tools with 
which broadband providers can protect their legacy cable affiliates from upstarts such 
as Netflix and Hulu. They also fear that firms will use capacity constraints to create 
artificial scarcity and pad profits while avoiding necessary network upgrades. These 
critics may have found a sympathetic ear at the Department of Justice, which has begun 
investigating whether data caps violate antitrust law.3 
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These concerns are largely misplaced. Usage-based pricing plans such as tiered 
service or data caps are not inherently anti-consumer or anticompetitive. Rather, they 
reflect different pricing strategies through which a broadband company may recover its 
costs from its customer base and fund future infrastructure investment. By aligning 
costs more closely with actual consumption, usage-based pricing may effectively shift 
more network costs onto those customers who use the network the most. Companies 
can thus avoid forcing light Internet users to subsidize the data-heavy habits of online 
gamers, movie "torrenters," and the like. Usage-based pricing may also help alleviate 
network congestion by encouraging customers, content providers, and network 
operators to use broadband more efficiently. 
 
Consumption-based pricing strategies are ways that broadband companies can 
distinguish themselves from one another to achieve a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. Only through experimentation and empirical measurement will providers 
find the optimal pricing solution — which may vary dramatically from network operator to 
network operator. Thus far, regulators have correctly rejected the call to interfere with 
this pricing flexibility absent a showing of market failure and consumer harm. 
 
It is possible that data caps or other forms of usage-sensitive pricing can be 
anticompetitive, but only if a firm with market power exploits that power in a way that 
harms consumers. Absent a specific market failure, which critics have not yet shown, 
broadband providers should be free to experiment with usage-based pricing and other 
pricing strategies as tools in their arsenal to meet rising broadband demand. Public 
policies allowing providers the freedom to experiment best preserve and promote the 
spirit of innovation that has characterized the Internet since its inception and which has 
served consumers so well. 
 
Usage-Based Pricing as a Cost Recovery Tool 
 
Usage-based pricing is a relatively new phenomenon in the broadband industry. 
Although early dial-up providers once offered metered per-minute access, America 
Online’s 1996 unlimited flat rate model proved so popular with consumers that the 
Internet access market abandoned usage-based pricing until recently.4 But this usage-
sensitive pricing strategy is common in many other networked industries with high fixed 
costs, including telecommunications. For many years, long-distance companies 
famously competed on the basis of their rate per minute. More sophisticated models 
charged lower rates on nights and weekends, partly to induce customers to shift call 
volumes to periods when the telephone network was underutilized. Many wireless 
providers offered plans allowing customers to purchase a fixed number of minutes per 
month and charging a per-minute rate for additional consumption, a model that closely 
resembles many broadband data cap plans. 
 
Broadband providers find usage-based pricing attractive in part because it shifts more 
network costs onto those consumers who use the network the most. Under a flat-rate 
system, all users pay the same amount to help cover network costs. But as the Federal 
Communications Commission has noted, “[r]equiring all subscribers to pay the same 
3 
 
amount for broadband service, regardless of the performance or usage of the service, 
would force lighter end users of the network to subsidize heavier end users.”5 Heavier 
users consume significantly more of the network’s total bandwidth each month than the 
average consumer. This means that light users pay a higher effective rate for 
broadband service, cross-subsidizing the activities of those who spend more time 
online.  
 
These effects would be unremarkable if most consumers used roughly the same 
amount of data, because the subsidy would be relatively small. Unfortunately, this is not 
the case. According to Sandvine’s Fall 2011 report on network traffic, the heaviest 1 
percent of North American users account for 15 percent fixed downstream traffic and 
almost 43 percent of total upstream use.6 By comparison, the lightest 60 percent of 
users generate only 10 percent of total traffic. And the gulf is vaster in the wireless 
space, where 90 percent of mobile traffic is driven by only 20 percent of users.7 Given 
these disparities, it is perhaps unsurprising that some broadband providers are 
exploring pricing plans that would mitigate the cross-subsidy and shift more network 
costs onto those who use the network the most. Some commentators have questioned 
the value of cost-shifting onto heavier users. Consumer group Public Knowledge notes 
that statistical multiplexing allows multiple consumers to use bandwidth simultaneously, 
meaning that each additional user adds only trivial marginal costs onto the network.8 
Similarly, Netflix general counsel David Hyman has written that because “the marginal 
cost of providing an extra gigabyte of data. . . is less than one cent, and falling,” there is 
“no good reason for bandwidth caps and fees to take root.”9 As a result, these skeptics 
claim it is “entirely inaccurate” to suggest that average users subsidize “bandwidth 
hogs.”10 They have called upon regulators to investigate whether data caps have any 
“legitimate economic justification.”11 
 
As an initial matter, this argument seems to misunderstand the role of regulation. These 
critics imply that equitable cost distribution is the only presumptively “legitimate” 
broadband pricing strategy and that companies must justify to a regulator any deviation 
from this model. But while equality seems appealing, there is no reason to believe that it 
represents the only, or even the best, broadband pricing structure. Generally, price 
experimentation allows companies to test potentially more efficient business models. 
This experimentation brings consumers the benefits of increased competition and 
increased choices in the marketplace. Normally, a regulator should intervene only if the 
practice actually harms consumers and if consumers cannot police the market 
themselves because the company has market power.  
 
But setting aside this general objection, focusing on only the marginal cost of each 
gigabyte of capacity tells us little about efficient broadband pricing. Other than during 
periods of congestion, the marginal costs of additional bandwidth consumption are very 
small. But emphasizing marginal costs ignores the significant fixed costs required to 
build and maintain a broadband network. Broadband providers have invested over $300 
billion in private capital in the past decade to build and upgrade the nation’s broadband 
networks.12 And these are not one-time costs: Cisco estimates that American Internet 
traffic will triple by 2016, and mobile traffic will grow sixteen fold.13 Analysts expect 
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broadband providers to invest $30-40 billion each year to expand and upgrade their 
networks to meet this demand.14 Marginal cost pricing is insufficient because it fails to 
provide sufficient revenue to recover these huge fixed costs and to fund future network 
investment. 
 
Thus for broadband providers and other industries with significant fixed costs, the 
challenge is to design a pricing structure that spreads fixed costs intelligently across the 
company’s customer base. There are many possible ways that a company may do so, 
but there is no economic reason to believe that, because incremental marginal costs are 
small, fixed costs should be shared equally across all consumers. In fact, writes 
economist Scott Wallsten, “efficient pricing will, in general, charge users with high 
demand more than users with low demand even if those users impose no additional 
costs on the network.”15 This practice is known as price discrimination. 
 
Although the term may sound sinister to some, economists understand that price 
discrimination is a common and often socially beneficial way for a firm to spread its 
costs across its customer base. Airlines, for example, may charge a business traveler 
more for a seat on a flight from New York to Los Angeles than the student in the next 
seat over. Business travelers tend to be less price sensitive, in part because their jobs 
require them to be in town at a specific time. Students tend to have more flexible 
schedules, and are more likely to shop on the basis of price. Airlines know this and price 
fares accordingly, for example by charging a discounted rate for round-trips with a 
Saturday night stay (a schedule that students like but business travelers find 
inconvenient). Similarly, movie theaters sell discounted seats to children and seniors 
while the rest of us must pay full price. In both cases, the marginal cost of an additional 
user is almost zero, yet the price difference between the two consumers is a legal and 
uncontroversial practice. Similarly, by pricing broadband service based upon the 
customer’s willingness to pay, the firm can spread its costs efficiently across its 
customer base and may lead firms to extend service at a lower rate to light users unable 
or unwilling to pay the unlimited flat rate. 
 
Although the impact of price discrimination in particular circumstances may vary, 
antitrust scholar Herbert Hovenkamp notes that “most price discrimination is socially 
beneficial” because it often yields greater total output than a forced nondiscriminatory 
pricing regime.16 Different customers have different reservation prices – the maximum 
price he or she is willing to pay for a product. When a firm must choose a single rate for 
all consumers, those with a reservation price above the actual price receive a windfall. 
But the windfall comes at a cost: customers who have reservation prices below the 
actual rate are denied service. Of course, the firm would prefer to serve any customer 
whose reservation price is above marginal cost – and this would also maximize total 
output. But a single rate at marginal cost would fail to cover fixed costs. Price 
discrimination therefore allows firms to expand total output and maximize the number of 
customers contributing to the fixed cost base, by charging a higher price to those with 
higher reservation prices and a lower price to those with lower reservation prices. 
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In the broadband industry, as with many high-fixed-cost industries, price discrimination 
based on customers’ willingness to pay is an efficient way to recover costs with minimal 
distortion to overall social welfare. This practice, familiar to many regulated industries, is 
known as Ramsey pricing.17 Ramsey pricing seeks to approximate as closely as 
possible the output achieved at marginal cost pricing, by raising prices more on those 
who are most willing to pay for the service, and less on those who would buy less (or 
not at all) if the price rose. Or in economic terms, the firm sets prices in inverse 
proportion to customers’ price elasticity of demand. In an ideal world, where the firm can 
perfectly separate each customer by his or her elasticity, Ramsey pricing would allow 
the firm to recover all of its costs while ensuring that few if any consumers who value 
the service at marginal cost will ever be priced out of the market.  
 
Data caps and other usage-based pricing strategies can approximate Ramsey 
efficiency. By paying for consumption, consumers reveal how much they value 
broadband access. This form of price discrimination allows providers to put more 
network costs onto those whose consumption is least sensitive to changes in price. The 
extent to which the pricing strategy approximates Ramsey efficiency depends on the 
ability of the pricing structure to separate customers by willingness to pay. Data caps 
divide the customer base into only two groups (typical users, who do not exceed the 
cap, and heavy users, who do), but allows further segmentation of the heavy user group 
through the overage charge. Tiered pricing is a more sophisticated variant of this 
strategy. By allowing customers to choose from an array of possible caps, the provider 
can segment its customer base more finely than with a simple cap. The provider can 
experiment with different tiers and different rates per tier until it finds the pricing 
structure that covers its fixed costs in the most efficient manner. 
 
Usage-Based Pricing and Broadband Penetration Rates 
 
Usage-based pricing may also make entry-level broadband access more affordable. 
Boosting broadband penetration rates is one of the Commission’s biggest public policy 
challenges.18 While 65 percent of Americans use broadband at home according to a 
2010 Commission survey, those without access are generally “older, poorer, less 
educated, more likely to be a racial or ethnic minority, and more likely to have a 
disability” than those with broadband in the home.19 According to the Commission’s 
survey, those without broadband access cited cost as the primary barrier to adoption.20 
If broadband providers can shift more network costs onto heavier users, they can offer 
lower rates for light users. This practice benefits firms and consumers alike: it allows 
firms to capture more of the demand curve, offering service to more people who value 
the service above marginal cost, while at the same time it narrows the “digital divide” 
between those who can afford broadband access and those who cannot. 
 
Of course, price discrimination only leads to higher adoption rates if broadband 
providers in fact lower prices for lighter users. This appears to be the case. A 2010 
study by Scott Wallsten and James Riso surveyed nearly 25,000 broadband plans 
across several OECD countries.21 They found that the average household paid, on 
average, about $164 less per year for a broadband plan with a data cap than for a 
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similar but unlimited plan, and $152 less per year for a residential triple play plan (which 
combine broadband, voice, and video) with a data cap compared to a similar but 
unlimited plan.22 As a result, Wallsten and Riso conclude that “many consumers, 
particularly the low-volume users, are likely to pay less for broadband with data caps 
than they would for plans offering unlimited data transfer.”23 
 
Usage-Based Pricing as a Congestion Management Tool  
 
Usage-based pricing may also help alleviate network congestion. Unlimited flat-rate 
pricing encourages overconsumption of network resources, because customers pay no 
additional charge for consuming additional bandwidth. This dynamic can create network 
congestion during peak online periods (a phenomenon with which wireless consumers 
in particular are familiar). Currently, congestion appears to be a much bigger issue for 
wireless than for fixed broadband providers, though the growth of Content Delivery 
Networks such as Akamai and Level 3 suggests that at least some Internet content and 
application providers are willing to pay to avoid congestion on the public Internet. By 
charging consumers for each additional unit of bandwidth consumed, usage-based 
pricing leads customers to internalize the costs that additional Internet use places on 
the network. This, in turn, could lead customers to demand that Internet content 
application and providers deliver content more efficiently to consumers. 
 
The effectiveness of usage-based pricing to manage congestion turns in part upon the 
structure of the pricing plan. Critics correctly note that data caps are a somewhat crude 
tool to address network congestion. Data caps that limit monthly data consumption may 
help reduce overall traffic on a network, a perk that seems to have helped wireless 
providers. But caps do not directly target traffic during peak periods when congestion is 
greatest. This is the equivalent of trying to solve rush-hour highway congestion by 
placing a limit on the number of miles each driver can drive each month. The cap may 
have some indirect effect on congestion, if heavy users choose to reduce consumption 
by reducing peak-time use. But the cap also targets heavy users who generate huge 
volumes of traffic during off-peak periods (for example, by backing up systems at 2:00 
a.m.), whose uses generate virtually no congestion costs. 
 
If feasible, peak-time pricing could be a more effective pricing strategy. But a peak-time 
plan would depend upon broadband providers’ ability to predict peak times and 
communicate that information clearly to consumers. On the fixed broadband side, the 
Commission has determined that peak time generally occurs between 7 p.m. and 11 
p.m. daily. But wireless networks are less predictable, which makes it more difficult to 
communicate to customers when they should shift nonessential broadband 
consumption. 
 
Usage-Based Pricing as an Anticompetitive Practice 
 
Skeptics may be correct that usage-based pricing could be used anticompetitively. 
Broadband providers that also provide cable service undeniably have incentives to use 
data caps to protect their legacy cable businesses from Internet-based competitors such 
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as Netflix. Critics note, for example, that Comcast has estimated that to replace its cable 
service with an over-the-top Internet-based competitor would require approximately 288 
gigabytes per month – a figure close to the 300 gigabyte cap that Comcast is currently 
test-marketing.24 Economists call this a vertical restraint on trade: the use of a position 
in one market to gain an advantage in a related market downstream.  
 
But regulatory intervention requires more than a showing that a vertically integrated firm 
has incentives to take actions that might harm competitors. The firm must also have the 
ability to do so. Antitrust law subjects almost all vertical restraints to the rule of reason, 
which makes these restraints actionable only if the firm has market power and causes 
consumer harm. Netflix may find that data caps are a threat to its current business 
model, which relies upon broadband providers to deliver its content to consumers. But 
the Supreme Court reminds us that antitrust law protects competition, not competitors. 
While some vertical restraints raise foreclosure concerns, as shown above, most are 
procompetitive because they generate efficiencies and enhance consumer welfare.25 
 
Broadband providers can offer several procompetitive justifications for data caps. First, 
as noted above, by shifting more of the network’s costs onto those who use it most, 
consumption-based pricing allow firms to offer a lower-tier of service to lighter users, 
which can extend service to lighter users who cannot or will not pay the higher unlimited 
rate. And they encourage consumers, content providers, and broadband providers to 
use bandwidth more efficiently. As critics point out, caps could also deter customers 
from canceling cable service in favor of Internet-based video options. This is harmful to 
those consumers who subscribe to both broadband and cable and who would cancel 
cable but for the data cap. But it could benefit those customers who subscribe only to 
broadband service: because cable and broadband service share common network 
costs, a shrinking base of cable subscribers would force the company to recover those 
costs by raising broadband rates. The net effect of the practice is difficult to determine 
with certainty, but the answer is not as clear-cut as critics suggest. 
 
Therefore while regulators should be watchful for potentially anticompetitive conduct, 
they should also remember that many vertical restraints are procompetitive. One cannot 
say as a general matter that data caps and other forms of usage-based pricing are 
inherently anticompetitive. The effect they have on competition turns upon a fact-
sensitive inquiry into the broadband provider’s market power, and quantification of the 
impact that the pricing strategy has on different segments of the provider’s customer 
base. Absent market power, consumers can avoid practices they dislike by defecting to 
more friendly providers. Regulation of pricing practices is warranted only where a 
company has market power and has wielded that power to harm consumers. 
 
Ultimately, data caps and other pricing strategies are ways that broadband companies 
can distinguish themselves from one another to achieve a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. Innovative pricing models can spread network costs in new ways and can 
promote greater efficiency by consumers, content providers, and the network operator 
itself. Only through experimentation and empirical measurement will providers find the 
optimal pricing solution – which may vary dramatically by network. Thus far, regulators 
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have correctly rejected the call to interfere with this pricing flexibility absent a showing of 
market failure and consumer harm. The newest move to data caps or tiered pricing 
business models should not provide the impetus to deviate from that reasoned stance.  
 
*  Daniel A. Lyons, an Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, is a 
member of the Free State Foundation's Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State 
Foundation is a nonpartisan, Section 501(c)(3) free market-oriented think tank located in 
Rockville, Maryland.
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